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Despite Australia’s strict quarantine practices, the northern tropical region of Australia is at risk of the 
importation of exotic emerging diseases. The 
region’s hot and humid climate is conducive 
to year-round production of mosquitoes and 
the pathogens they transmit. It is imperative 
that disease control measures extend beyond 
Australia’s borders to improve surveillance, 
laboratory capacity and clinical practices in 
developing countries in our region. 
Of particular importance to Northern 
Australia is the importation of vectors and 
diseases through the ‘Indo-Papuan conduit’, 
the land and waterways directly to the 
north of Australia, connecting southeastern 
Indonesia and New Guinea (including the 
West Papuan province of Indonesia and 
Papua New Guinea [PNG]) to the Torres 
Strait and Cape York Peninsula of Australia. 
Cultural and trade ties throughout this region 
result in the cross-border movement of 
people, livestock, wildlife and – potentially 
– pathogens and vectors. This traditional 
movement was recognised with a cross-
border treaty allowing for free movement of 
people living in coastal villages of PNG and 
outer islands of the Torres Strait for traditional 
activities.
Recently, the Indo-Papuan conduit has 
been linked with numerous importations 
of exotic diseases and vectors into Australia 
(Figure 1). In this commentary, we discuss 
historical examples of disease and vector 
incursions, highlight future threats (Table 
1) and advocate for improved engagement 
and capacity development with our northern 
neighbours.
Japanese encephalitis virus (JEV) is endemic 
to Southeast Asia, where it causes outbreaks 
of potentially fatal encephalitis. This flavivirus 
was first detected in Australia in April 1995 on 
the island of Badu in the Torres Strait.1 In this 
outbreak, there were three human cases (two 
fatal) and JEV was detected in domestic pigs 
(an amplifying host) and Culex annulirostris 
mosquitoes, and serosurveys indicated it was 
widespread in domestic pigs on other islands. 
This led to a human vaccination campaign in 
1996 and the gradual removal of backyard 
piggeries.2 Subsequent surveys established 
that JEV was present in the Western Province 
of PNG, the likely source of the Torres Strait 
incursion.3 Nearly annual detections of JEV 
in sentinel pigs or mosquitoes occurred on 
Badu until those programs were disbanded. 
In addition, several incursions into Cape York 
Peninsula occurred, although there is no 
evidence that the virus became established 
in the Australian mainland.4 These repeated 
detections of JEV indicate that the Indo-
Papuan conduit is a source of active JEV 
movement into the region.
There have been repeated dengue outbreaks 
in the Torres Strait since an outbreak of 
dengue virus 1 (DENV-1) in 1981 on Thursday 
Island.5 Six subsequent outbreaks resulted 
in 547 confirmed cases and two deaths (Joe 
Davis, Queensland Health, unpublished data). 
Dengue outbreaks in the Torres Strait are 
thought to commonly originate from PNG, 
as they typically start on a single outer island 
then rapidly disseminate to other islands 
and even to mainland North Queensland. An 
outbreak of DENV-2 started on Mer Island in 
November 1996 and rapidly spread to other 
islands before causing outbreaks in Cairns 
and Townsville, with a total of 201 confirmed 
cases.6 Before 2005, all outbreaks were 
thought to be transmitted by Aedes aegypti. 
However, in 2005, Aedes albopictus was 
detected throughout the Torres Strait,7 and 
was the suspected vector in an outbreak of 
DENV-1 on Erub in 2015, the first occurrence 
of dengue transmission by this mosquito in 
Australia.8
Because of the establishment of 
Aedes albopictus in the Torres Strait, the area 
is now at risk of a new mutated strain of 
chikungunya, adapted to Ae. albopictus as its 
primary vector.9 In June 2012, an outbreak 
of chikungunya started in a PNG town on 
the border with Indonesia10 and rapidly 
spread throughout much of the country. 
Assessments concluded that Pacific Island 
communities and Northern Australia were 
at high risk of chikungunya virus (CHIKV) 
incursion,11,12 and the public health response 
was rapid; health personnel in the Torres 
Strait were trained to detect CHIKV symptoms 
and to test and notify suspected cases. Vector 
control staff developed rapid response plans 
should CHIKV transmission be suspected. 
Fortunately, no CHIKV transmission occurred 
in the Torres Strait or wider Oceania regions. 
However, the risk of further CHIKV outbreaks 
remains as there is evidence the virus is 
still circulating in PNG (Papua New Guinea 
Institute of Medical Research, unpublished 
data) and Indonesia.13
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Figure 1: The Torres Strait islands, showing past and current disease risks through the Indo-Papuan conduit. 
This map has been reproduced and amended with permission from the Queensland Health, Tropical Public Health Services, Health Surveillance Unit, Cairns, Qld, Australia.
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Outbreaks of Zika virus (ZIKV) in Micronesia 
and French Polynesia were the first hints that 
this vector-borne pathogen had the potential 
to become a global health emergency.14 
However, it wasn’t until the explosive 
outbreak in Brazil, linked to microcephaly 
in newborn children, that the true impacts 
of the virus were realised.15 Because ZIKV 
is efficiently transmitted by Ae. aegypti and 
Ae. albopictus mosquitoes, which are both 
abundant in the Asia Pacific region,16 ZIKV is 
likely to circulate well beyond the countries 
in the region in which transmission has been 
identified. Inadequate disease surveillance 
in many countries in the Asia Pacific region 
coupled with the usually mild presentation of 
Zika disease allows for cryptic circulation.
Exotic species of mosquitoes have also been 
introduced into the Torres Strait via the Indo-
Papuan conduit. The Japanese encephalitis 
vector Culex gelidus was first confirmed in 
the Torres Strait in 2000. Since then, multiple 
detections of JEV have been made from 
this mosquito on Badu and Moa Islands,17 
and the mosquito is established in much of 
Northern Australia. The most notorious exotic 
mosquito to be introduced into Australia via 
the Indo-Papuan conduit is the Asian tiger 
mosquito Ae. albopictus.18 This highly invasive 
mosquito was first detected on Masig Island 
in the Torres Strait in March 2005. Subsequent 
delimiting surveys found large populations 
of this aggressive mosquito throughout 
much of the Torres Strait.7 A Commonwealth 
funded Ae. albopictus control program has 
nearly eliminated it from Thursday and 
Horn Islands and prevented its spread onto 
the mainland of Australia.8 This mosquito 
is a serious concern for the transmission of 
DENV and CHIKV in the Torres Strait, and 
could become a dangerous pest mosquito 
in much of urban eastern Australia, resulting 
in significant economic loss.19 Ae. albopictus 
has displaced Ae. aegypti in some regions, 
notably much of Florida and the outer islands 
of the Torres Strait. Thus it could displace 
Wolbachia-infected Ae. aegypti established in 
North Queensland, destroying this successful 
dengue prevention strategy.20 Strategies of 
using Wolbachia virus-blocking strains in Ae. 
albopictus should be investigated for use in 
the Torres Strait.
While malaria is endemic in PNG and 
Indonesia, and large numbers of introduced 
cases occur in Australia annually, we do not 
perceive the re-establishment of malaria as a 
serious threat to Australia. The primary vector 
in Northern Australia, Anopheles farauti, is 
also common in adjacent coastal PNG, but 
is restricted to coastal wetlands north of 
Townsville, and has a limited flight range. 
Occasional small outbreaks of malaria do 
occur in areas of North Queensland where 
An. farauti is common, such as Saibai Island 
in the Torres Strait and lowland rainforests in 
Northern Queensland.21 Due to the limited 
range of the vector, and the presence of 
a strong public health system, it is highly 
unlikely that malaria will become established 
in Northern Australia.
Tuberculosis (TB) represents one of the 
greatest human health threats of all infectious 
diseases, killing more people per year than 
any other pathogen, including human 
immunodeficiency virus (HIV) and malaria 
combined. Increasing drug resistance is the 
greatest barrier to global TB control because 
multi-drug resistant TB (MDR-TB) requires 
costly, lengthy treatment and more often 
results in treatment failure.22 
Over the past 30 years, TB epidemiology 
has changed in North Queensland. In the 
1990s, most tuberculosis came from endemic 
transmission among Indigenous inhabitants, 
predominantly from the Northern Peninsula 
Area rather than the Torres Strait.23 Recently, 
a new epidemiology has emerged with 
most TB cases notified from this region 
coming from PNG nationals and many of the 
Mycobacterium tuberculosis (Mtb) isolates 
being multidrug-resistant.24 Strains arising 
in patients from PNG diagnosed through 
Torres Strait health services exhibit high 
genetic clustering, suggesting an intense 
focus of transmission.25 Furthermore, there 
is epidemiological evidence of primary 
transmission (direct person-to-person spread) 
of MDR-TB in this group.25
Although the absolute number of cases 
of tuberculosis in the Torres Strait Islander 
inhabitants is relatively small, with 20 cases 
over the two-year period of 2014–2015,26 
the incidence is approximately 200 per 
100,000 for those years. This rate is nearly fifty 
times higher than in Indigenous Aboriginal 
communities elsewhere in Australia27 and 
more than 200 times higher than the non-
Indigenous Australian-born population.28 This 
likely results from proximity to PNG. Across the 
international border on Daru Island, Western 
Province, PNG, the incidence of MDR-TB alone 
is estimated to be 1,000 per 100,000,29 making 
it higher than any nation in the world. Here, 
primary transmission of extensively drug-
resistant tuberculosis has been observed.30 
The official estimate of tuberculosis incidence 
in PNG in 2015 was 432 per 100,000.31 This is 
likely an under-estimate, and notification rates 
of 1,000 per 100,000 were observed when 
measured accurately and systematically in the 
Gulf Province.32 
Under the National Health Partnership 
Agreement on Health Services, Queensland 
Health provides emergency treatment to PNG 
nationals who access health facilities in the 
Torres Strait and elsewhere in Queensland.33 
The rapid and effective management of PNG 
nationals at these facilities is an important 
Table 1: Exotic pathogen risks for Australia through the Indo-Papuan conduit.
Pathogen Animal reservoir Vector Current distribution Evidence for threat to Australiaa
Japanese 
encephalitis virus
Ardeid wading birds 
and pigs
Culex 
mosquitoes
Asia Van den Hurk et al., 2003; Van den Hurk 
et al., 2008; Hall-Mendelin et al., 2012; 
Dengue virus Humans Aedes 
mosquitoes
Asia, Africa and south/
central America
Naish et al., 2014; Viennet et al., 2014; 
Akter et al., 2017
Zika virus Humans Aedes 
mosquitoes
Asia, Africa, south/central 
America and Oceania
Baggoley et al., 2014; Viennet et al., 
2016; Duchemin et al., 2017
Chikungunya virus Humans Aedes 
mosquitoes
Asia, Africa, south/central 
America and Oceania
Horwood et al., 2013; Viennet et al., 
2013; Roth et al., 2014; Suhrbier and 
Devine, 2016
Rift Valley fever 
virus
Livestock Various 
mosquito 
species
Africa, Middle East Turell and Kay, 1998
Yellow fever virus Humans Aedes 
mosquitoes
Africa, south/central 
America
Van den Hurk et al., 2011
Rabies Canines N/A Global (Asia, Africa, 
Americas, Eastern Europe) 
Sparkes et al., 2015; Brookes and 
Ward, 2017; Brookes et al., 2017
Highly pathogenic 
avian influenza 
virus
Charadriiformes and 
Anseriformes water 
birds
N/A Asia, Africa, Middle East Tracey et al., 2004; East et al., 2008a
Nipah virus Pteropus fruit bats 
and pigs
N/A Asia Roche et al., 2015
Drug resistant 
Mycobactcerium 
tuberculosis
Humans N/A Global Gilpin et al., 2008; Queensland Health, 
2017; Donnan et al., 2017; 
Note:
a: References are listed in Supplementary file
436 Australian and New Zealand Journal of Public Health 2018 vol. 42 no. 5
© 2018 The Authors
Commentary
step to minimise the spread of infectious 
diseases, in particular, tuberculosis. However, 
care for chronic health conditions, recall of 
patients and follow-up are not permitted, 
necessitating referral of cross-border PNG 
nationals presenting to clinics in the Torres 
Strait to Daru. To enable safe transfer of 
patients with tuberculosis and other health 
conditions and to exchange clinical and 
surveillance data, it is imperative to maintain 
good cross-border communications between 
PNG and people within the Torres Strait 
Protected Zone. Early diagnosis and contact 
tracing of cases arising within the Torres Strait 
will be necessary to prevent drug resistant TB 
spreading further through North Queensland.
Both the Northern Territory and Queensland 
have strong surveillance and control 
programs for exotic mosquitoes, and the 
Department of Agriculture and Water 
Resources monitors for exotic mosquitoes 
at ports. The Northern Australia Quarantine 
Strategy monitors for exotic livestock 
pathogens, including JEV, in sentinel animals 
and mosquito traps.34,35 Queensland Health 
administer the Aedes albopictus Control 
Programme in the Torres Strait,8 and also 
actively respond to outbreaks of dengue in 
the region. The Aedes-borne diseases of Zika, 
chikungunya and particularly dengue remain 
the greatest ongoing arboviral risks to the 
area. However, as the global sweeps of these 
viruses illustrate, exotic viruses can suddenly 
appear and cause major outbreaks. Therefore, 
disease and mosquito surveillance in the 
Torres Strait and the Indo-Papuan conduit 
need to be strengthened. Currently, mosquito 
surveillance is limited to the inner islands of 
Thursday and Horn. Periodic entomological 
surveys should be conducted to determine 
the status of Aedes vectors, with studies to 
understand their inter-island distribution so 
control programs can target high risk areas. 
Public health workers should be informed 
of risk diseases such as chikungunya and 
dengue and be vigilant for their introduction. 
Rapid identification and response is critical to 
preventing large outbreaks of exotic disease 
and the establishment of exotic vectors. We 
encourage the development of sustainable 
vector control programs in high-risk areas of 
PNG and Indonesia that will improve health 
outcomes to residents and decrease the 
risk of disease incursions into Australia. In 
addition, further engagement and capacity 
development with our northern neighbours 
is critical to reduce the risk of exotic disease 
outbreaks and further expansion of MDR-TB.
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